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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH G. TOOTh'IBS, 
Plaintiff and App-ellant, 
-vs.-
JACK DONALD TOOMBS, RO-
LAND J. TOOMBS, individually { 
and as Guardian ad litem of the \ 
said Jack Donald Toombs, a 
minor; ALMA TOOMBS, 
EDRIS GLASJ\!ANN, and 






STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff Joseph G. Toombs 
from a Decree entered by the Honorable John L. Sevy, 
Jr., sitting as Judge of the District Court of Box Elder 
County, which Decree was entered on the 27th day of 
February, 1957 (R. 520). The action was originally com-
menced on February 24, 1950, by the filing of a Com-
plaint by the plaintiff for the purpose of impossing a 
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constructive trust, with respect to the defendants, Jack 
Donald Toombs, Roland J. Toombs, and Alma Toombs, 
on certain real property situated in Box Elder County, 
near Promontory, Utah, and known as the Cedar Springs 
property (R. 490-492). The Plaintiff is the nephew of 
the defendant Alma Toombs, and a cousin of Roland J. 
Toombs, who is the son of the said Alma Toombs. Jack 
Donald Toombs is the son of Roland Toombs, and the 
grandson of Alma Toombs. It is therefore evident that 
the defendants are in close relationship one with the 
other, not only by family but also by reason of their 
activities conjointly in operating land adjacent to the 
Cedar Springs land in Box Elder County. Since the 
action was commenced, the defendant Jack Donald 
Toombs has died, so that Roland J. Toombs and Emma 
Toombs, his wife, distributees of the estate of Jack Don-
ald Toombs, deceased, have been substituted as parties 
defendant in place and instead of the said Jack Donald 
Toombs (R. 515). Likewise defendant Edris Glasmann 
and J. M. Toombs 'Yere dismissed as parties defendant so 
the action now remains against Roland J. Toombs indi-
idually and Roland J. Toombs and Emma Toombs, his 
wife, as distributees of the estate of Jack Donald Toombs, 
deceased, and Alma J. rroomhs. 
The land involved wns originally acquired in two 
separate contiguous trarts consisting of 186% acres and 
60 acres. Plaintiff's r.laim, as set forth in his Complaint, 
js twofold: With respert to the 186%-acre tract, plaintiff 
~laims that he is the ow·ner of an undivided l/3 interest 
therein by reason of having joined "rith his father, Jo-
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seph M. Toombs, back in approximately 1906, in purchas-
ing this land from the defendant Alma Toombs. Plain-
tiff further claims that he paid through labor a sum 
equivalent to 1/3 of the purchase price and has at all 
times since the time of purchase been the owner of a l/3 
undivided interest, although the title to the property was 
taken in the name of Joseph M. Toombs. 
The other theory of plaintiff's claim for a construc-
tive trust relates to the entire tract of property consisting 
of 2461j2 acres (independently of the 1/3 undivided inter-
est claimed by the plaintiff as to a 1/3 interest in the 
186¥2 acres). With respect to the entire tract of land 
the plaintiff claims that at the time the title to the prop-
erty was acquired by them, said defendants were under 
obligation to the plaintiff by oral agreement to acquire 
said land for him and in his name, and that because of 
such agreement and by reason of their relationship one 
with the other and to the plaintiff, the court should im-
pose a constructive trust on the property for the bene-
fit of the plaintif. (R. 490-492) 
In their Answer first filed herein, defendants 
admitted: 
"That on or about the 21st day of March, A. D. 
1913, plaintiff and his father, J. M. Toombs, pur-
chased from the defendant Alma Toombs land 
in Box Elder County, State of Utah, described as 
follows: The SW% of Section 34, Township 11 
North, Range 7 West, S.L.M.; also, beg. at the 
SE corner of the SWlJ., of said section 34, thence 
running East 53 rods, thence North 80 rods, thence 
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West 53 rods, thence South 80 rods to beg., con-
taining 1861/2 acres, more or less.'' (R. 493) 
Defendants further admitted: 
''that the defendant Alma Toombs, on or about 
the 20th day of October, A. D. 1948, entered into 
an oral agreement with and between the plaintiff 
to purchase certain described land in the county of 
Box Elder, State of Utah, in consideration where-
of the plaintiff was to reconvey certain land lo-
cated in Box Elder County, State of Utah, to the 
defendant, Alma Toombs. That the defendant 
Alma Toombs purchased and paid for said land 
and had the same placed in the name of his grand-
son, Jack Donald Toombs, a minor." (R. 494) 
As a "Second Defense" to plaintiff's Complaint, and 
by further answer to paragraph V of plaintiff's Com-
plaint, defendants alleged that the oral agreement with 
and between plaintiff and defendant Alma Toombs: 
''was simply one for the purchase and sale of real 
estate. Under said agreement the parties above 
named were dealing \Yith each other as co-princi-
pals and not as principal and agent. Therefore, 
the oral agreement fails '"ithin the pronsions of 
Title 33, Chap. 5, Section 3 of the lftah Code Anno-
tated 1943, providing that e\er~~ contract for the 
sale of land or an interest therein shall be void 
unless the contract or some note or memorandum 
thereof is in "~riting. Further .. that the agree-
ment 0ntered into between the parties above 
named "~as one for the joint benefit of both parties. 
Said agreement cannot be enforced under the pro-
visions of Utah Code Annotated above cited, un-
less the same, or some memorandum, is in writ-
ing." (R. 494) 
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This Answer was filed in the Court on March 17, 
1950. Thereafter, on March 25, 1950, defendants filed an 
Amended Answer in which the admissions made as set 
out above were eliminated and the allegations of the 
Complaint with respect to such matters were denied 
(R. 497, 498). 
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint September 7, 1950 
(R. 500-505), which was answered by the defendants on 
September 22, 1950 (R. 506-510). The case was tried by 
the Court without a jury beginning December 4, 1950 
(R 1), and was taken under advisement on January 13, 
1951, at the conclusion of the trial. 
Counsel for the respective parties filed written briefs 
with the Court. Thereafter, on March 17, 1952, the Court 
rendered a Memorandum Decision stating generally that 
the Court found "in favor of the defendants and against 
the plaintiff, no cause of action." The Court further di-
rected defense counsel to prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree ''in accordance here-
with." Notwithstanding this direction, no action was 
taken by defendants or their counsel until after plaintiff, 
in February, 1956, filed a Motion requesting the Court ''to 
withdraw its Memorandum Decision filed herein, and to 
reopen the case for the purpose of allowing counsel to 
reargue and resubmit the matter either with or without 
additional testimony" (R. 512). During the interim of 
approximately four years numerous attempts had been 
made by counsel for plaintiff to have the Court enter 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree, and 
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the Court in turn had made numerous requests upon de-
fense counsel to prepare Findings, Conclusions, and 
Decree. As stated by plaintiff's counsel in the Motion to 
Reopen, counsel for defendant had "neglected, failed, 
and refused to submit any Findings to the Court, so that 
the Court has not been in a position fully and completely 
to pass upon the merits of the case, and to make an in-
telligent and complete analysis of the issues for the pur-
pose of preparing and making its Findings and 
Conclusions herein'' (R. 512, 513). 
This Motion was argued before the Court on April 
11, 1956, up to which time counsel for defendants had still 
failed to draft any proposed Findings, Conclusions, or 
Decree. Following the argument on !lotion the Court 
refused to reopen the case and again directed defendants 
to prepare Findings and Conclusions to be submitted for 
approval and signature. Such Findings, Conclusions, and 
Decree 'vere submitted and signed by the Court on Feb-
ruary 27, 1957. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
In connection wi t.h this appeal, Plaintiff contends: 
1. The trial court erred in refusing to reopen the 
ease after a lapse of more than :fiye years after the case 
had been tried and more than four years after counsel for 
defendants had failed to prepare Findings and Conclu-
sions for the Court's approval. 
2. The Findings as ultimately entered by the Court 
on Februa.ry 27, 1957, are not supported by the evidence 
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but are contrary thereto insofar as the Findings are in 
favor of the defendants and against plaintiff. 
3. The Judgment and Decree are not supported by 
the evidence. 
4. The evidence in the case requires a finding that 
Plaintiff is the owner of a 1/3 undivided interest in and 
to approximately 1861;2 acres by reason of having pur-
chased the same with his father, J. M. Toombs. 
5. The evidence requires a finding by the Court that 
defendants hold the real property in question in trust for 
the use and benefit of the plaintiff upon the payment by 
the plaintiff of the amount paid by defendants for said 
property, and that defendants should account to plaintiff 
for all the rents, issues, and profits received by them from 
said property during the time the same has been in their 
possession. 
For convenience of the Court and to consolidate the 
foregoing points for argument, plaintiff proposes to 
argue the same under the following categories: 
I. Error of the trial court in failing to find that 
plaintiff is the owner of a 1/3 undivided interest in ap-
proximately 1861;2 acres of land purchased by him with 
his father, J. M. Toombs. 
II. Error of the trial court in failing to impose a 
constructive trust in respect to all of the real property 
consisting of approximately 2461h acres and requiring 
defendants to account to plaintiff for the rents, issues and 
profits received therefrom. 
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ERR.OR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT PLAINTIFF IS THE OWNER OF A 
1/3 UNDIVIDED INTE-REST IN APPROXIMATE-
L Y 1861!2 ACRES OF LAND PURCHASED BY IDM 
WITH HIS FATHER, J. M. TOOMBS. 
In order for the Court to make an accurate appraisal 
of the evidence of this case as it relates to Appellant's 
Points I and II, a synopsis of the testimony of each of 
the witnesses is herein reported. 
The plaintiff Joseph G. Toombs testified that he and 
his father bought the quarter section of land in 1907 
(R. 8) and that the deed was issued in about 1913 (R·. 15). 
In 1948 plaintiff learned that his sister Edris Glasmann 
had obtained a deed from their father to the property; 
( R. 23) that thereafter plaintiff had made several at-
tempts to purchase the property and on one occasion had 
accepted an offer made to him by :Jirs. Glasmann, through 
her husband, to purchase the property for Forty-five 
Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00). However, this offer and 
aeceptance had been "Tithdrawn by ~Irs. Glasmann so 
that he did not get the property for that amount 
(R. 24-30). 
Plaintiff talked on several occasions to the defend-
ant Alma Toombs (his uncle and brother of Joseph 
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Toombs, the father) about buying the property. On one 
occasion (the day before the property was acquired) the 
defendant Alma Toombs came to his home and in the 
presence of other witnesses drew on a notebook a dia-
gram of the property showing that a house and othe·r 
improvements (which Alma Toombs believed was on his 
property adjoining) was in fact on the property in ques-
tion. This diagram was identified as Exhibit No. 2 and 
admitted in evidence (R. 30-32). At that time Alma 
agreed with the plaintiff that if the plaintiff would sell 
Alma approximately two acres on which said improve-
ments were located, said defendant Alma Toombs would 
go down to Ogden and purchase the property in question 
for the plaintiff. Plaintiff agreed to allow Alma to do 
this and thereupon did not go to Ogden the following 
morning when the property was sold. (R. 30-32) In fact, 
plaintiff testified that when he was contacted by telephone 
he told them to sell .the property to AI. (R. 89) Upon 
returning from Ogden Alma told the plaintiff that he had 
bought the property and agreed to get together in a day 
or two and fix the matter up (R. 33). Thereafter plain-
tiff saw the defendant Roland Toombs and at that time 
Roland stated that the title to the land had been put in 
the hands of Roland's son. (R. 33) 
On cross-examination the plaintiff testified that his 
sister Edris Glasmann and the others would not have 
given him a chance to buy the property if it were not for 
the fact that plaintiff's father had insisted and that if 
plaintiff's father "were here today he would testify to 
it." (R. 89) He identified Exhibit 3 which is an Affidavit 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
executed by the father Joseph Toombs with respect to 
the property. Exhibit 3 was admtted in evidence; (R. 109-
110) and reads in part as follows : 
''A number of years ago my son, Joseph and I, en-
tered into an agreement with my brother, Alma 
rroombs, whereby we agreed to purchase 186.50 
acres of ground in Sec. 34, Twp. 11 N.R. 7 W., 
SI~~i, known as Cedar Springs property in Box 
Elder County, Utah. This is sage brush land with 
some cedars on it. 11y son Joseph fenced part of 
same about four years ago, and I told him to go 
ahead and use the land, or my share of same, for 
pasture, to reimburse him for the work and mate-
rial for fencing. Before that time it was a part of 
the open range. 
* * * * * 
'' Sometime ago I made a deed in favor of my 
daughter Edris Glasmann as I was owing doctor's 
bill and hospital fee, coYering the 186.50 acres 
known as the Cedar Springs property .... I ad-
vised my son-in-la,,, A. I~. Glasmann that my son 
Joseph "Tas to have the first chance to buy the 
land at Cedar Springs for a less price that other 
people "Tould pa~T for same, and I wanted the 
money obtained from the sale to pay my hospital 
and doctor bills.'' 
The plaintiff further testified that he and his Uncle 
''AI'' had Ya rious business dealings in the past~ that they 
had worked quite elosely together; and that plaintiff 
plneed considerable trust and confidence in his uncle, 
pa rtienlarly in ngTee_ing to let him go down to Ogden and 
buy the property for the plaintiff. (R. 100) 
Arnold Christensen testified that he had agreed to 
mal{e a bid of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) for the 
10 
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Cedar Springs property on behalf of Joseph G. Toombs, 
the plaintiff. On cross-examination he described the 
transaction as follows : 
''A. Well, they mentioned that. The question 
was put to me, or I put it up to them. I came to 
buy the place and asked them what they had. 
Asked them if it would be fair if they gave me the 
bid. They mentioned the highest bid. I said, 'If 
I beat the bid I want to buy it.' And they agreed 
to do that. They agreed to sell me the land. If 
I beat the bid what they were bid, and I bid them 
$5,000 cash. Then they wanted to give their Uncle 
Al a chance. This one lady said, 'We better give 
Uncle Al a chance.' '' 
* * * * * 
''A. Well, when I came back again about a week 
after, I honked him out and he came out to my 
car and he said, 'You won't need to go any more 
to make a bid on it. My Uncle Al is bidding it in 
for me.' '' 
Alexander Dickey testified that in the year 1942 while 
on a wate rsurvey at Cedar Sprngs he had a conversa-
tion with Alma Toombs, who was constructing a granary 
on a water survey a.t Cedar Springs he had a conversa-
tion. The conversation also included Mr. Joseph G. 
Toombs, the plaintiff. At that time Alma. Toombs pointed 
out to Mr. Dickey the dividing line between Alma Toombs' 
property and the property belonging to Joseph G. Toombs 
and stated to Mr. Dickey that Joseph G. Toombs owned 
a l/3 interest in the field lying adjacent to his (Alma 
Toombs) land and immediately south of his house. 
(R. 124, 125) He further testified that J. M. Toombs, fa-
ther of the plaintiff, told the witness that plaintiff owned 
11 
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62lf2 acres of the Cedar Springs property and that he had 
fed cattle for it. (R. 124) 
Mr. Dickey testified that on the evening of October 
18, 1948, when he was about to go into the home of plain-
tiff and had gotten out of his car, another car pulled up 
ahead of him and because of that the witness did not go 
into the· home but decided to come back the next day. The 
following morning Joseph Toombs told him that his Uncle 
'' Al'' had gone down to Ogden to buy the Cedar Springs 
property for plaintiff. (R. 132) 
On cross-examination Mr. Dickey testfied that the 
reason he had gone to J. ~I. Toombs was that he was in-
terested in finding out who discovered Cedar Springs 
(R. 128). He again repeated that J. M. Toombs told him 
that Joe owned about 62% acres which he had paid for 
by feeding cattle for Alma Toombs. (R. 128-129) 
Edward L. Thorsted testified that he is the son-in-
law of the plaintiff; that he was in plaintiff's home in the 
forepart of October, 1948, when a conversation took place 
involving Alma Toombs and his wife, Joseph Toombs and 
his "Tifc, and the ''Titness and his wife. That on such occa-
sion he was introdueed to ... :\Jma Toombs who seemed 
excited about a laud surYey 'Yhich had just been made 
which had found that his home and granary and water 
troughs were oYer on Joe's property. On that occasion 
Alma Toombs told plaintiff: 
"A. . .. 'I ,II purchase all that land for you, 
.Joe, if you 'viii s0ll me that small portion that my 
houst) nnd granary and the water trough is on.' 
12 
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And father-in-law says, 'You know that I own that 
portion of land,' and he says, 'Yes, I remember 
you worked for that and paid for it.' Well, my 
father-in-law says, 'Well, if you purchase that 
land,' he says, 'I '11 give you that small portion of 
land your property is on.' And Mr. Alma Toombs 
says, 'That would be swell.' He says he didn't 
want there's fellow named Christensen that he 
mentioned that he said he didn't want him to get 
hold of the land, because he was sure he wouldn't 
be able to purchase the land from him, and he 
would lose his home and all.'' (R 135) 
Wayne Toombs, plaintiff's son, testified that he and 
his father ran cattle and horses on the Cedar Springs 
property for as long as he could remember. He detailed 
the manner and method of operating the Cedar Springs 
property from 1939 until1948. (R.141) He further stated 
that for several years during this period of time he and 
his father had exchanged with the defendant Alma 
Toombs use of the Cedar Springs property and the prop-
erty which Alma Toombs owned adjacent thereto. (R. 
144, 145) He further testified to a conversation which his 
father and Alma Toombs had just prior to ''Peach Day'' 
in the latter part of August or the first part of Septem-
ber, 1948, as follows: 
''A. Well, I drove up in front of the place and 
dad and AI was sitting on the fence there talking 
about the Cedar Springs property at that time. 
And dad was telling him, 'I don't believe they'd 
sell it to me, because . . . they were mad at me. ' 
And Al said he would go down and buy it for my 
father. 
'' Q. What did your father say to that? 
13 
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''A. Well, dad said that he'd be glad to have 
him do, because he wanted it.'' (R. 146, 147) 
The witness testified that later in October he over-
heard a conversation between defendant Alma Toombs 
and his father as follows: 
"Al was pretty excited about the property at Ce-
dar Springs. He said they had it surveyed and he 
found out that his house and his barn and hls cor-
rals, water trough, \Vas over on the Cedar Springs 
property there. And he said he had been down to 
try to buy that piece of ground off from them, but 
they would not sell it to him. He said he could 
buy it all, but he didn't want it all because he had 
enough ground as it was and he wanted dad to buy 
it, and Al said he would go buy it for him." 
(R. 148) 
After a deed had been obtained to the land in the 
name of the defendant Jack Toombs, several conversa-
tions occurred between the plaintiff Joseph Toombs and 
the defendant Roland Toombs or Alma Toombs or both. 
The witness testified that on one occasion in the presence 
of a Jfr. David Richards the following conversation took 
place: 
'' .1\. ''7 e discussed the boundaries. We drew the 
place out on a piece of board and w·e ''ere dis-
cussing ho\v things \rer(~ there. Roland said he 
would like to keep four rods east of the house and 
running north over to the end of that forty. And 
I snid, •Well, gosh! you don't need that much.' 
'\V(1 ll,' l1e said, '1\1 like to keep on a straight 
ft~nce.' We asked him "Thy he "'"anted it, and he 
Raid he didn't have no dooryard left there if he 
didn't get some ground there. ..A .. nd \Ye told him 
we wouldn't let him has·e the four rods clear 
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through, but we agreed to let him have two rods 
in front of his house and leave the fence south of 
his house where it was. As Roland went to go he 
says, 'Well,' he says, 'My father has gone to Cali-
fornia. I would like to wait until he gets back be-
fore I turn the deeds.' We said, 'How long will 
that be~' And he says, 'About three weeks.' Well, 
we agreed that probably that "\vas all right." 
(R. 154) 
Nellie Toombs, wife of the plaintiff, testified as to 
her knowledge of the use and occupation of the land in 
question by the plaintiff during the years preceding 1948. 
With respect to the conversation which occurred in their 
home in the early part of October, 1948, the witness 
testified: 
"A. Well, he told Joe that it was a big section 
and he just had it surveyed, and, of course, I told 
that once. The improvements were all over on 
Joe's land. He says, 'I don't know what I'm going 
to do. I've been down to Ogden to buy this land, 
and they won't sell it to me.' And he seemed very 
angry at the Glasmanns. He says, 'They're trying 
to sell the water to Brownings, and Christensen 
and Mr. Hendricks are trying to buy the land also, 
and I don't want them in there. Now, Joe, he 
says, 'I've got all the land I want. I don't want 
any more, and if you want me to buy this land for 
you.' He says, 'You can't buy it if you go down 
there. They're mad at you, they won't sell it to 
you.' He says, 'I'll go down and buy it. I think 
I can buy it.' Then he asked Joe if he'd give him 
this two acres, deed him this two acres, and Joe 
says, 'I '11 give you the two acres if you get the 
land for me, Uncle AI.' " (R. 181, 182) 
The witness further testified that she was present 
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the night before Alma Toombs went to Ogden to purchase 
the land at which time the following conversation ensued: 
''A. He says, 'Joe, they're selling the place in 
the morning.' And Joe says, 'Yes, I've heard 
they are.' And he says, 'They're goiong to call 
you up, but,' he says, 'You turn that down, be-
cause they will not sell it to you.' He says, 'Your 
dad wants you to have it, but Glasmann does not 
want you to have it, but I can buy it.' And he 
says, 'If you '11 secure my property around there, 
those two acres, I '11 go down and buy it and turn 
it over to you.' " (R. 184, 185) 
OWEN L. BROUGH testified that he was the County 
Treasurer of Box Elder County between 1935 and 1947. 
He identified plaintiff's Exhibit 6 as comprising tax 
notices for several years; that he had a personal recol-
lecton of having received taxes from Joe Toombs and 
that Joe Toombs had paid taxes on the Cedar Springs 
property in the years 1939 and 1942 of his own recollec-
tion. (R. 200, 204) 
D.A_ VID RICHARDS, an elderly gentlemen of 70 
years of age, testified that he was acquainted with the 
Cedar Springs land and that he had arranged with Joe 
rl,oombs on many occasions to run cattle on the property. 
He was present at a conversation 'vhieh occurred between 
.Joe 'roombs and the defendant Roland Toombs in the 
month of November, 1948, at the plaintiff~s home . .LL\._t this 
c-onversation W nyne '\Tayne Toombs "·as also present. 
rrhe 'vi tness 1<.\stified as follo"·s: 
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''A. Why, this gentleman back here, Roland 
Toombs, he came around the south of the house 
here and stepped up to Joe and Wayne and he 
says, 'Joe,' he says, 'I've come to see what you 
intend to do about that Cedar Springs property.' 
Joe says, 'Just as I agreed to do.' He says, 'What 
was that agreement~' He says he agreed to turn 
that part of the barn and house is over to his fa-
ther if he would buy the other part for him. 
'' Q. Then what was said~ 
"A. Then he says, 'We had them put it in Jack's 
name to keep him out of the draft,' and he says, 
'If you let us keep it in Jack's name until spring, 
we '11 turn it over to you.' 
"Q. What if anything did Joseph Toombs say~ 
"A. Well, he got kind of huffy and says, 'What 
did you do that for~ I don't know what you put 
it in his name for. You had no right to.' " 
( R. 212, 213) 
ABINADI TOLMAN testified that he was well 
acquainted with the parties to the matter as well as with 
the property in question; that he had discovered from 
examination of the records that the title to the land ap-
peared to be in the name of J. M. Toombs and had there-
fore contacted Mr. J. M. Toombs for the purpose of leas-
ing the property on an Oil and Gas Lease (215-217). At 
that time Mr. J. M. Toombs told the witness that his son 
Joseph G. (plaintiff) owned the north third or 62¥2 acres 
of the property (R 2173. Mr. Tolman likewise gave an 
accurate account of the conversation which took place in 
the home of the plaintiff on the evening preceding the sale 
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of the land in question. He fixed the date as October 18th, 
and testified concerning Alma's promise: 
''A. Well, he said, 'If you go down '-he said, 
'Your father wants you to get the place.' And he 
said, 'If you should go down there, Joe, you'd 
only get in a squabble with your sisters, and I've 
made arrangements that I can buy the place, but 
I don't need it and don't want it. If you will deed 
me the land that my house and granary is on.' 
Later in the conversation he repeated it several 
times. He said, 'My house and the trough, water 
trough.' And then Joe says, 'Well, how is that~' 
'Well,' he said, 'I've had Mr. Griffiths out and 
survey it, and he finds that's a large section, and 
so he said in equalizing the land there my house 
eomes under your 62¥2 acres.' And so he took his 
finger and he drew how it was, and then he said 
to ~frs. Toombs, 'HaYe you got a piece of paper 
here!' And ~frs. Toombs got up and she turned 
the light on as she did. The light didn't shine di-
reretly at me, but I c.ould see :Jir. Alma Toombs 
because he sat directly from me, but I was in the 
shadows of the lamp. ..A.nd she got the paper and 
he dre"'" how it "·as. ...lnd he had, running frqm 
the quarter section, running east, he drew it so 
you could see it "·as crooked running off a good 
many degrees north of east, but he took his pencil 
after he got through and said, • This is all I want 
is this pieee right here. It's about t"·o or two and 
a half acres.' " (R. :2~1, :2:2~) 
He identified the \Yriting as Plaintiff~s Exhibit 3 and 
fu rt.her t<.)s t i:fied : 
''A. 'Well,' he said, 'your father "Tants you to 
hav(\ it, ,Joe,' and he said, 'They'll call you in the 
morning. They'll call you in the morning, and all 
you have to do is say that I'm going to buy it.' 
18 
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And I don't know. Of course, in the conversation 
that came up several times during the time he was 
there." (R. 221, 223) 
LOIS THORSTED, daughter of plaintiff, testified 
that she worked in the Box Elder County Treasurer's 
Office from 1938 to 1945 and was acquainted with the 
procedure for mailing tax notices ; that she was likewise 
acquainted with the Cedar Springs property. (R. 228, 230) 
During the time she worked in the Treasurer's Office her 
father paid the taxes on the Cedar Springs property each 
year except for two occasions, on when she paid them and 
one when her grandfather J. M. Toombs paid them. 
(R. 321) 
On cross-examination she testified that her father 
paid the taxes on the Cedar Springs property in cash 
while he paid taxes on other property in his own name 
by check, stating to her that he did not want to get the 
matter mixed up for income tax purposes. R. 239) 
In addition to the foregoing witnesses who testified 
for plaintiffs, plaintiff introduced portion of depositions 
of defendants taken by plaintiff, in which defendants 
testified as follows : 
ALMA TOOMBS testified plaintiff asked him if he 
would go down and get a deed for the plaintiff and Alma 
told plaintiff he would do so. ( R. 344) After the property 
had been purchased the defendant testified that ''Roland 
agreed to turn it over to him.'' Roland ''came in and told 
me he was going to let Joe have it back." (R. 347) 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ROLAND TOOMBS testified that he knew plaintiff 
<·.laimed an interest in the property before he went to 
()gden about buying it; (R. 349) that his father Alma 
said he had promised to buy it for plaintiff and "I heard 
him say he would buy this before I went to Ogden.'' This 
could have been as much as two weeks or more before land 
\Vas acquired. (R. 351) 
Subsequent to obtaining the deed there was a con-
t't·rence at the home of Alma Toombs, at which defend-
ants Alma, Roland and Donald as well as plaintiff and 
Wayne Toombs, son of the plaintiff, were present. This 
meeting w·as arranged for the purpose of discussing turn-
ing over the deed on the property to plaintiff. Roland tes-
tified that at that time he was going to turn the property 
over to the plaintiff if they could agree about protecting 
Roland on the house and yard in the corner of the prop-
<._)rty. (R. 354, 335) He ''as concerned about being pro-
tected because the surYey which had been made showed 
that the house and yard were on the adjoining land. (R. 
:135, :156) He further testified that plaintiff told him he 
eould keep \Yhat he \Ynnted around the house and that the 
defPIHlant Roland stated that he ""anted to keep ten rods. 
Defendant Roland then testified .... I "·as going to town 
and \\·<.) could fix it up there, and come to find it had to be 
RnrYPycd oY<.)r ag-ain, and I told him \Ye couldn •t do it until 
spring. We had to take an engineer out and get it 
Ht.raig-htt~llPd up." (R. :i:J(), 357) 
,JACI{ D<)NALD TOOMBS testified that he ha.d 
heard plaintiff eluim n one-third interest in the Cedar 
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Springs property as early as about 1940. (R. 359, 360) 
He also testified that he didn't go to Ogden the day that 
the property was going to be sold, that he had been down 
there before but he didn't go down there on that day; 
(R. 360) that "We had talked about it and decided we 
had to do it because it was close to our house, and we 
didn't know exactly where the line was.'' (R. 361) He 
likewise remembered the conference at the home of Alma 
Toombs shortly after the property was purchased. The 
various parties met there by appointment and "We told 
them that we'd sell it to them if we could agree on the 
terms around the house and that, and we didn't come to 
any agreement then. They were going to leave it until 
next spring." (R. 363) He also knew that this grandfa-
ther Alma, had agreed to go talk to the sisters about pur-
chasing the property for the plaintiff. (R. 363, 364) 
Much of the evidence introduced by defendants cor-
roborates plaintiff's position in this matter, although con-
tradicting plaintiff in respect to some of the claimed con-
versations which took place before the property was pur-
chased. The evidence introduced by defendant is summar-
ized briefly as follows : 
A. L. GLASMANN testified that plaintiff had stated 
that he wanted to buy the property and that the witness 
had told plaintiff there was no reason why he couldn't. 
(R. 247) The vvitness later talked to Arnold Christensen 
about selling the land to him. (R. 248) The Plaintiff's fa-
ther had ''expressed desire that Joe be given privilege 
of buying this land at the best figure offered by anybody 
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else. So I had Mr. Gale, who was my other brother-in-law 
and is also my auditor, call Joe Toombs up.'' (R. 249) 
This call apparently took place the morning that defend-
ant Alma Toombs and Roland came to Ogden to buy the 
property. The witness testified he heard Mr. Gale talk 
to the plaintiff and that he also talked to the plaintiff at 
which time plaintiff stated he was not interested in pur-
chasing the property. (It is interesting to note that Mr. 
Gale testified that he was the only one who talked to plain-
tiff on the telephone.) 
The witness further testified he had sent plaintiff a 
letter dated October 14,1948 (Defendant's Exhibit "A"), 
in " .. hich he had stated that "Your younger sisters are all 
pretty sore at the way you have tried to shirk your duties 
in regard to your father, etc. They ha\e asked me to in-
stitute suit against you if I can find any basis for a suit 
for the past use of the lands owned by your father and 
used by you for the last 40 years without adequate pay-
ment." The letter also stated that :Jlrs. Glasmann had 
agre0d to sell the land to someone else on October 19th 
for the sum of Fi, .. e Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) unless 
she rt>reived a higher bid. (R. 260) Previous to this time 
dPfendant Alma Toombs had talked to the witness about 
wanting just a piece of the property: (R·. ~61, 262) that 
the only persons to "·hom ,, .. itness talkt"}d about buying the 
property "·erP Roland Toombs and Alma Toombs. 
(R. ~56) 
IIA I~OLD F. 0 ALE test:fied that he "\Yas employed by 
the (lg-dtlll Standard-Examiner and "\vas a brother-in-law 
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of the witness A. L. Glasmann. (R. 265) In the middle of 
1948 plaintiff stated that he owned a one-third of the Ce-
dar Springs property. (R. 266) He testified that he called 
the plaintiff on October 20, 1948, and said: 
''Joe, Al and Roland is here to buy the property.' 
And I says, 'Do you want it~ I've just left your 
father and Mrs. Glasmann, and they wanted me 
to give you the first chance to buy the property.' 
And he says, 'Harold I don't want it. It isn't 
worth that money to me.' And so I said, 'Joe, the 
family is going to sell it so is all right with you~' 
And he says, 'It's all right with me.' So from 
then we sold it to Jack. I made out the deed that 
day and J a.ck bought the property." (R. 267) 
The property was paid for by Roland Toombs and 
Alma Toombs each giving a check for one half. (R. 268) 
The checks were introduced as Defendants' Exhibit ''F.'' 
On cross-examination Mr. Gale testified that defend-
ant Alma Toombs had previously mentioned that his 
house was on a small portion of the Cedar Springs prop-
erty and he wanted to he protected. (R. 272) That he 
alone talked to plaintiff on the telephone (R. 272) at 
which time he told plaintiff that Alma and Roland were 
there to buy the property and the plaintiff told witness 
to sell it to him. (R. 282) Prevously, plaintiff's father 
had told the witness to be sure to give plaintiff a first 
chance to buy the property. (R. 272) He knew the plain-
tiff had been using the land for 40 years. (R. 275) By 
way of conclusion he further testified that he was inter-
ested in seeing that the conveyance made by Mrs. Glas-
mann to the defendants "remain as is." (R. 282) 
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MYRTLE E. TOOMBS (who was present in the 
court room during previous testimony after the court had 
made an order of exclusion but was nevertheless per-
mitted to testify over objection of the plaintiff) testi-
fied that she is a sister-in-law of the plaintiff. That she 
had never heard plaintiff claim to own a third interest in 
the Cedar Springs property although she had not seen 
him a great deal over the past years. (R. 284-286) 
DEO LOUISE GALE testified that she is the wife of 
Harold Gale and a sister of the plaintiff. (R. 290) In the 
spring of 1948 when her father went to the hospital, plain-
tiff told her he thought he ought to have ''Cedar,'' (R. 
293) but she did not hear him claim to own a third inter-
est in the property. (R. 293) She had attempted to contact 
plaintiff on several occasions but was not successful. 
WheneYer a bid was receiYed on the property it would be 
communicated to their father "Who repeatedly said, "Give 
,Joe another chance,'' so the girls would hold the property. 
(R. 302) 
GlTSSIE RAY Sl\fiTH testified that she is a sister 
to plaintiff and liYes in Palo ~\Ito~ California. (R. 305) 
She neYer knc"T plaintiff claimed an interest in the Cedar 
Springs propPrty until the trouble started. (R .. 307) "When 
~liP tnlked 1o thP plaintiff at the time her father -was in 
the hospi tnl in l~l+S~ plaintiff "~oul dsay, d Don ~t you think 
I should llaYP (\,dar~~ and "Don~t ~Ton think it belongs 
to me.'' (I~. 308) 
\V. II. G l~IFFITHS "~a.s called :first as a "~itness for 
dt~fendaut a11d later as a "Tituess for the plaintiff. He 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
testified that he was the County Surveyor. (R. 312) Ac-
cording to a notation made in his day book (Defendants' 
Exhibit "H"), he was out at the Alma Toombs property 
west of Promontory on October 17, 1948, for the purpose 
of making a survey for a water filing for Alma Toombs. 
At that time he was concerned with establishing the 
northeast corner of the southwest quarter of the section, 
where the water location would be filed. (R. 321) At that 
time he determined that the section vvas a large section. 
(R. 324) He testified that he also determined that part of 
Alma's house and the area to the south within the fence 
enclosure was south of the quarter section line which 
would place it on the property here involved; and that he 
told Alma and Roland of this discovery. (R. 418, 419) 
ALMA TOOMBS, one of the defendants and uncle 
to the plaintiff, testified he bought the land in question 
from the State and sold it to plaintiff's father. (R. 327) 
He went dovvn to Ogden in the latter part of October at 
the request of plaintiff to see the Glasmanns and the gir Is 
about plaintiff buying the property at Cedar Springs. 
(R. 328, 329) He testified that when he eame back from 
Ogden he told plaintiff he wouldn't buy the property for 
him because plaintiff could buy it for himself. (R. 330) 
On cross-examination he testified that he knew plain-
tiff had run cattle over the property in question for many-
years. (R. 339) He admitted that in his deposition he 
knew of plaintiff's claim to one-thrd of the Cedar Springs 
property before he had gone done to Ogden to do any-
thing about buying the property; (R,. 337) that he had 
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talked to plaintiff two or three times about going down to 
buy the property for him. (R. 338) He further remem-
bered a meeting which took place at his home shortly 
after the property had been purchased at which he, his 
son Roland, his grandson, Jack, the plaintiff, and plain-
tiff's son \Vayne were present. At that time Roland 
agreed to turn the land over to the plaintiff (R. 340) 
LILLIAN TOOMBS testified that she is the wife of 
the defendant Alma Toombs and knew he had gone to 
Ogden in the fall of 1948 to purchase the property for 
the plaintiff. (R. 367) However, she testified that later 
she heard Alma tell plaintiff that he could go himself that 
he didn't want to have anything more to do with it. (R. 
368, 369) 
JOE BROWN testified that he lived in Promentory, 
Utah, and was employed by the defendant Roland 
Toombs; that he had certain conversations with Wayne 
and that he had been present in the spring of 1949 when 
conversations had taken place between the parties to this 
matter. (R. 375) 
EDRIS GLASMANN testified that she is the wife of 
A. L. Glasma.nn and a sister of the plaintiff; (R. 391) that 
she and her father had paid the taxes each year on the 
property in question and identified Defendants' Exhibit 
''I'' as being a group of the tax notices ·w·hich had been 
paid. However, on voir dire she could not remember any 
dates on which taxes had been paid. (R. 392) She testi-
fied that plaintiff had talked about getting their father to 
sign Cedar over to him when the father was in the hos-
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pital of March 1948, (R. 397) but she never knew that 
plaintiff claimed a third interest in the property. (R. 398) 
She further testified that several weeks before the 
property was sold the defendant Alma talked to her about 
buying it, stating he wanted it for his grandson but never 
mentioned that he was there to buy it for the plaintiff. 
(R. 399-401) She believed he offered Four Thousand Dol-
lars ($4,000) for the property at that time. (R. 407) Al-
though she called on defendant Alma Toombs in Brig-
ham City to discuss the matter of purchasing the prop-
erty, she never called on the plaintiff. (R. 402) 
On cross-examination she testified that the land had 
been given to her by their father to sell to pay his ex-
penses and that her father wanted plaintiff to have the 
first chance to buy the property. (R. 403) She was in the 
process of checking on the value of the property and 
finding a buyer for it from the time she got the deed on 
July 15, 1948 until the property was sold in Oc.to her of 
that year. (R. 403, 404) To show her attitude and ani-
mosity toward the plaintiff we quote her testimony as 
follows: 
'' Q. As a matter of fact you have never been to 
his home to talk to him about this property, have 
you~ 
''A. Neither has he to mine. 
''Q. Well, have you been to his home~ 
"A. N . o, s1r. 
'' Q. All right. You knew that he has a home in 
Brigham City~ 
''A. I've been told. 
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"Q. And you've also been told that you're his 
sister~ 
''A. I've been told that. 
'' Q. Do you resent the fact that you are his 
sister~ 
''A. I'm not answering that. 
"Q. Do you bear any animosity towards your 
brother Joe~ 
"A. I'm not answering that." (R. 404) 
WILL· M. JACOBSEN testified that he is a son-in-
law of the defendant Alma Toombs and lives at ~fantua, 
• 
Utah. (R. 419) He had never heard plaintiff claim a one-
third interest in the Cedar Springs property, nor had he 
ever asked plaintiff if he owned any property. (R. 422) 
ROLAND J. TOOMBS, one of the defendants, tes-
tified that he talked to the plaintiff about October 18, 1948, 
on Forrest Street in Brigham City, Utah, after he had re-
ceived a letter, Defendants' Exhibit "J.'' (R. 424-427) 
At that time plaintiff said he did not want the property. 
(R. 425) He likewise testified that he was the one who 
went to Ogden to put in a bid and bought the property for 
his son. ( R. 428) (Note, this testimony is contradictory 
to the finding of the court to the effect that the transac-
tion of the sale and purchase of the property '' \Yas ne-
gotiated by Alma Toombs, grandfather, of Jack Donald 
Toombs as agent and for the use and benefit of Jack Don-
ald Toombs." (R. 517) He paid one-half of the purehase 
price, his father paid the other half, and the deed was 
taken in the name of the defendant Jack Donald Toombs. 
(R. 429) Since that time Jack has paid a. portion of the 
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purchase price back. (R. 431) In January of 1949 they 
had a meeting at his father's home at which his father and 
Joseph Toombs got into an argument about whether the 
father had agreed to buy the prperty for Joe but at the 
conclusion of the meeting Roland asked his son Jack, 
"What do you think~ Think we ought to let them have 
it?' And he said, 'I guess so.' " (R. 440) Later on in 
March of 1949 he told the plaintiff that he wanted $25.00 
an acre (which was $5.00 an acre more than was paid for 
the property) and plaintiff said he would not pay. 
( R. 440-442) 
On cross-examination the defendant Roland Toombs 
admitted that his testimony before the court differed in 
several respects with the testimony given in his deposi-
tion because ''I found out different since then.'' He ad-
mitted that he had been told by the surveyor Griffiths 
about the conflict on the location of the home and other 
improvements before acquiring the property; (R. 448) 
that he first talked about putting the property in Jack's 
name when he was in Ogden to bid on the property. 
(R. 449) 
With respect to the meeting at his father Al 's he 
testified: 
'' Q. The purpose of your going down to Al 's 
place on about the fourth of January, 1949, was to 
discuss the arrangement for turning over the 
deeds to Joe, wasn't it~ 
''A. Discuss the property, yes. Took it over. 
''Q. And at that time you agreed to turn the 
property over to him, didn't you~ 
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"A. y . es, s1r. 
'' Q. And your son Jack was there~ 
"A. Yes, sir." (R. 454) 
Before this meeting defendant Roland Toonbs had 
offered to pay plaintiff what he had in the property if 
he would figure it out, but plaintiff later came back and 
stated, ''he was going to keep it. ' ' ( R. 456) 
JACK DONALD TOOMBS, one of the defendants 
and the son of the defendant Roland Toombs, (R. 459) 
testified that he went to Ogden on the day that the bid 
was put in for the property but not the next day when 
the deed was delivered. (R. 461, 462) He testified that 
before the property was purchased he had heard plain-
tiff tell Roland Toombs that plaintiff did not want the 
property, (R. 464) but he further testified that he agreed 
with his father after the property was purchased to sell 
it to the plaintiff. (R. 467) 
On cross-examination he testified that he ratified and 
approved all that his father and grandfather had done on 
his behalf in acquiring the property. (R. 471) He knew 
that the plaintiff claimed an interest in the property for 
many years before it was purchased and that plaintiff'had 
run cattle on the place most of the time. (R. 475) His 
father Roland and he had discussed the facts of the case 
with their counsel Mr. Mason before the original answer 
was prepared in which it "\Vas admitted that there was an 
agreement between plaintiff and defendant Alma Toombs 
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EMMA M. TOOBS testified that she is the wife of 
the defendant Roland Toombs and the mother of Jack 
Donald r_roombs; that she was with her husband at the 
home of the plaintiff during the fall of 1948 and heard 
the plaintiff state that the defendant Alma Toombs had 
talked to him about the dispute over the boundary lines 
and that she had repeated he couldn't have done so he-
cause at that time the Glasmanns "didn't know there was 
any dispute about where the boundry line was." (R 484) 
The foregoing summary of testimony conclusively 
establishes that plaintiff purchased with his father the 
quarter-section of land consisting of 186¥2 acres and is 
the rightful owner of an undivided one-third interest 
therein. The only evidence to the contrary is the state-
ment of Alma Toombs that he sold the property to plain-
tiff's father. However, plaintiff's father in his affidavit 
(Exhibit 3) states "A number of years ago my son, J o-
seph and I, entered into an agreement with my brother, 
Alma Toombs, whereby we agreed to purchase 186.50 
acres of ground in Sec. 34, Twp. 11 N.R. 7 W., SLM, 
known as Cedar Springs property in Box Elder County, 
Utah." Surely the elderly Mr. J. M. Toombs (who is the 
predecessor in interest of defendants Roland and Jack 
D. Toombs) should know more about the matter than 
any one else. All of the defendants admitted they knew 
of plaintiff's possession of the property for approximate-
ly forty years and knew of his claim before they ob-
tained title. We do not understand how the trial court 
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II. 
ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN FAILING TO 
IMPOSE A CO·NSTRUCTIVE TRUST IN ALL OF 
THE REAL PROPERTY CO,NSISTING OF AP-
PROXIMATELY 2461;2 ACRES AND REQTJIRING 
DEFENDANTS TO ACCOUNT TO PLAINTIFF 
FOR THE RENTS, ISSUES AND PR.OFITS RE-
CEIVED THEREFR01M. 
What has been said above with respect to the weight 
and effect of the evidence relating to plaintiff's one-third 
interest in the Cedar Springs property applies likewise 
to the testimony with respect to plaintiff's claim that 
Alma Toombs had agreed with plaintiff to purchase the 
land for him. The original Answer admitted this (R. 494) 
but claimed the agreement was within the Statute of 
Frauds. The court found that Alma. Toombs ''was not 
at any time employed as an agent and trustee by Joseph 
G. Toombs, the plaintiff herein, to purchase the last above 
described real property for Joseph G. Toombs from 
Edris Glasmann" (R. 517). This finding is an absolute 
contradiction of the testimony of the defendant Alma 
Toombs, who admitted that he had agreed to endeavor to 
buy the property for plaintiff. He attempts to exonerate 
himself by saying that this agreement was rescinded. 
However, the evidence is clear that plaintiff at all times 
wanted the property. He told his sisters he ''anted it and 
should be entitled to it. He "\Yas unable to deal on the 
matter himself because of the animosity his sister Edris 
Glasmaru1 had for him, and therefore endeavored to haYe 
Arnold Christenson acquire the property on his behalf. 
When this failed, he made arrangements "\vith Alma 
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Toombs to buy the property for him and told Mr. Chris-
tenson to forget the matter. Likewise, his testimony is 
clear that the only interest the defendants had in the 
property was to protect themselves in the acquisition of 
the corner on which their buildings may have been lo-
cated. Each of the defendants testified that even subse-
quent to the acquisition of the property by them they 
agreed to turn it over to the plaintiff and plaintiff has at 
all times stood ready, 'villing and able to pay them the 
amount of the purchase price upon their delivering a 
deed to him less the two acres in the upper northeast cor-
ner of the quarter section. 
The issue raised by defendants initially and which 
was argued at length to the trial court was to the effect 
that a constructive trust could not be imposed under the 
facts of this case. We respectfully submit that the law 
is well settled that a constructive trust should be imposed 
under such a situation. 
A good discussion on the subject of constructive 
trusts is contained in American Jurisprudence, Volume 
54, under the title of Trusts. Section 241 of Trusts ( vol-
ume 54) Am. Jur. 184, contains the following quotation: 
''All authorities agree upon the principle that a 
constructive trust will arise where, in addition to 
the breach of agreement to purchase for the owner 
or one having an interest at such a sale, there are 
circumstances of fraud or abuse of confidence, con-
duct, or facts that would tend to raise an equitable 
estoppel to assert the defense of the statute of 
frauds. A constructive trust will be declared 
where it appears that the promises or principal 
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furnished the purchase money or a part thereof; 
refrained from bidding by reason of the agree-
ment, promise, or agency; relaxed his efforts to 
save the property from being sold, or to prevent a 
sale at a sacrifice; or where it appears/that the 
promisor or agent bought in the property at a 
price greatly below its value, or that the agree-
ment was known to other possible bidders and as a 
consequence chilled their bidding. 
Likewise, the Restatement on the Law of Restitution 
sets out the principle of law applicable to this case, as 
follows: 
"(1) A fiduciary '''"ho purchases from a third 
person for himself individually property which it 
is his duty to purchase for the beneficiary holds it 
upon a constructive trust for the beneficiary. 
'' (2) A person who agrees with another to pur-
chase property on behalf of the other and pur-
chases the property for himself individually holds 
it upon a constructive trust for the other, even 
though he is not under a duty to purchase the 
property for the other.'' (Restatement of Resti-
tution, Section 194, Pages ·795, 796) 
Scott of Trusts, Volume 3, Section 499, has the fol-
lowing to say with reference to a purchase by a fiduciary 
of property which he should purchase for another: 
"A person in a fiduciary relation to another who 
purchases property for himself indiYiduall~.,. may 
be chargeable as constructi Ye trustee of the prop-
erty, even though he purchases it from a third per-
son and not from himself as fiduciary. He is 
chargeable as a constructiYe trustee where he pur-
chases for himself individually property \vhirh 
he should purchase for the beneficiary.'' 
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This authoritative work in the field of trusts then 
goes on to state that the question involved is one of de-
termining whether the fiduciary relationship exists, and 
discusses the various situations in which the relationship 
would automatically arise, among them being the rela-
tionship of family, guardian and ward, principal and 
agent, employer and employee, and so forth. After dis-
cussing various relationships of this nature the author 
states the following : 
''Even though there was no pre-existing fiduciary 
relation, and even though the defendant was not 
employed professionally by the complainant, and 
even though no continuing fiduciary relation was 
contemplated, yet if the defendant undertakes 
with the complainant to purchase property for 
him, and purchases the property for himself, he 
can be charged as constructive- trustee of the prop-
erty. Although the oral undertaking is not en-
forceable as a contract, because of lack of consid-
eration or because the property is an interest in 
land, yet a fiduciary relation was created and the 
fiduciary will not be permitted to profit through 
a breach of his duty as fiduciary. By undertaking 
to purchase the property for the complanant, the 
relation of principal and agent was created. Such 
a relation arises where one person undertakes to 
act for and in behalf of another, even though the 
undertaking is gratuitous and oral. Accordingly, 
it is held that a person who undertakes to pur-
chase land for another and who purchases it for 
himself is chargeable as constructive trustee of the 
property, even though the undertaking is gratui-
tous and oral. In Harrop v. Cole [85 N.J. Eq. 32, 
95 Atl. 378; Aff'd 86 N.J. Eq. 250, 98 Atl. 1085] 
the complainants orally employed the defendant to 
purchase certain land for them, but the defendant 
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purchased the land with his own money and took 
a conveyance to himself. The court gave a decree 
establishing a constructive trust for the com-
plainants and directing the defendant to convey 
the land to the complainants upon payment of the 
price. The court said that where one man assumes 
to act as agent for another and the other reposes 
confidence in him, a fiduciary relation arises, al-
though there is no written contract or no contract 
at all. If the agent violates his duty as fiduciary, 
a constructive trust arises. The court said that it 
was immaterial that there was no antecedent fidu-
ciary relation, and that it arose contempora-
neously with the particular transaction.'' 
This court has previously considered the matter of 
imposing a constructive trust. In the case of Haws v. 
Jensen., 116 Utah 212, 209 P. 2d 229, this court had before 
it the question of imposing a constructive trust where 
the decedent had executed a warranty deed to her daugh-
ter with the understanding that her daughter would hold 
the property for the use and benefit of the other children. 
The facts, therefore, are not in point, but the principles 
of law laid down by the court are of particular importance 
in the following respects : 
1. As to whether it would be necessary to have any 
statement in writing in order to impose a constructive 
trust, the court held: 
''Admittedly there is no "~riting eYidencing Mrs. 
Haws' intention that the property conYeyed by 
her he held in trust by Amer. Ho"\\rever, under cer-
tain circumstances existing at the time a conYey-
ance in trust is made, no 'vriting eYidencing an 
intent to create a. trust is required. In those in-
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stances, equity will impress a constructive trust 
upon the property in favor of the person or per-
sons designated by the grantor as the beneficiary 
or beneficiaries of the oral trust. A constructive 
trust, being an equitable remedy to prevent unjust 
enrichment, arises by operation of law and is not 
within the statute of frauds.'' 
2. With respect to the facts necessary to show a 
confidential or fiduciary relationship, the Supreme Court 
stated: (quoting from Scott on Trusts, volume 1, Section 
42.2) 
''A constructive trust is imposed even if there is 
no fiduciary rela.tionshi p such as that between at-
torney and client, principal and agent, trustee and 
beneficiary; it is sufficient that there is a family 
relationship or other personal relationship of such 
a character that the transferor is justified in be-
lieving that the transferee will act in his interest." 
Restatement of the Law of Trust, Sec. 44, com-
ment (c), accord. A constructive trust will be im-
posed even though at the time of the transfer the 
transferee intended to perform the agreement, and 
even though he was not guilty of undue influence 
in procuring the conveyance. The abuse of the con-
fidenital relation consists merely in the failure of 
the transferee to perform his promise. Scott on 
Trusts, Vol. 1, Sec. 44.2. A court of equity in 
decreeing a constructive trust, is bound by no un-
yielding formula, but is free to effect justice ac-
cording to the equities peculiar to each transaction 
wherever a failure to perform a duty to convey 
property would result in unjust enrichment. 3 
Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Part 1, 1946 Ed. 
§ 471." 
In the case of Barrett v. Vickers, 100 Utah 534, 116 P. 
2d 772, where the plaintiff sought to evict certain de-
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fendants from the property, a counter-claim was :filed by 
defendants and intervenors for the purpose of imposing a 
constructive trust on property which had therefore be-
longed to S.D. Vickers. The facts in the Vickers Case are 
quite similar to those contained in the instant li-;_,lgation. 
There the evidence revealed that at the time of the death 
of S. D. Vickers, he owned a ranch near Nephi, Utah, 
which was mortgaged to the State of Utah. Because of 
the inability of his estate to continue the payments the 
State foreclosed on the mortgage and the property was 
about to he taken over by it. Prior to the expiration of 
the period of redemption the family met together and 
discussed the possibility of repurchasing the land from 
the State. Thereafter, on or about July 21, 1938, the 
plaintiff Arliean Vickers Barrett entered into a contract 
with the State to repurchase the ranch, to which contract 
her husband, George C. Barrett, became a party in De-
cember 1938. The other parties to the action claimed 
that the plaintiffs George Barrett and his wife Arliean 
Vickers Barrett, had agreed to acquire the property for 
the benefit of all of the children and that they were 
therefore entitled to their pro rata interest in the prop-
erty. The evidence discloses that because some of the 
children were financially embarrassed the agreement was 
made that George C. Barrett "rould advance part of their 
payment, whereas ,one of the other children would ad-
vance the balance. It further appeared that the State of 
Utah refused to deal with any of the children except 
George Barrett and his 'v~fe. The lo,ver court found from 
the evidence that the plaintiff, George Barrett and wife, 
were constructive trustees for the use and benefit of the 
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other children of the decedent to the extent of the agree-
ment whieh was entered into and not merely to the extnt of 
the amount of money paid by each, so that the plaintiffs 
and other children would each have an undivided one-
fourth in the property when it was paid for. 
One of the defenses raised in that case was that the 
agreement, if any, wa~ (\Tal and therefore within the 
statute of frauds. In disposing of this point the court 
held: (quoting from the syllabus) 
''Parol evidence is admissable to show a trust re-
lationship by operation of law.'' 
''Evidence which was sufficiently clear, unequiv-
ocal and explicit to show that ranch which had 
been bought by plaintiffs from state under agree-
ment with defendants and intervenors that each 
family was to have an undivided one-fourth inter-
est and that plaintiffs and intervenors advanced 
down-payment but later defendants tendered their 
shares, established a ''trust'' in plaintiffs for each 
family of an undivided one-fourth interest in the 
ranch.'' 
In the case of Hawkins v. Perry (Utah 1953) 253 P. 
2d, 372, the court imposed a constructive trust where the 
plaintiff had given money to his uncle, a minister of the 
gospel, to be used in purchasing a home, with the under-
standing that title would be taken in the uncle's name 
until the plaintiff became of age. The facts disclosed that 
the uncle had taken the home in the name of himself and 
wife and that the uncle's interest was subsequently 
acquired by his wife in divorce proceedings. The court 
held that under the circumstances the evidence not only 
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showed a confidential relationship between the plaintiff 
and the uncle but also that the wife was not a bona fide 
' purchaser in due course and had no beneficial interest in 
the realty as against the plaintiff. 
Cases from other jurisdictions also support the 
plaintiff's position in this matter. In Maddox v. Maddox, 
151 Neb. 626, 38 N.W. 2d 547 (1949) the plaintiffs brought 
an action to have the trial court declare and enforce a 
constructive trust with relation to a one-fifth interest in 
the estate of Wesley H. Maddox, deceased. The action 
was brought against one of the heirs and his wife, by cer-
tain other heirs. The testimony disclosed that William 
M. Maddox, husband of defendant, proposed to the other 
children of decedent that they buy the one-fifth interest of 
th widow (a second wife) of the decedent to which the 
other children agreed. However, notwithstanding that 
he was designated and authorized to act as agent for the 
others to acquire the interest, he made negotiations with 
the widow but did not complete the purchase in conform-
ity with the agreement. Rather, thereafter, on October 
9, 1947, defendant's wife, with full notice and knowledge 
of the agreement aforesaid and in violation thereof, 
bought the one-fifth interest of the "Tidow, paying by 
check drawn upon their joint bank account. Even though 
the property was purchased by the 'Yife of the defendant 
(the latter being the one who plai11tiffs claimed was obli-
gated to make purchase for plaintiffs) the court held: 
''This court has also adhered to the rule that 
where one person undertakes as agent to purchase 
property for another, the other to pay part or all 
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of the purchase price and become owner of all 
or a part of the property proportionate to his con-
tribution, the purchase price thereof by such per-
son in his own name or otherwise for himself, gives 
rise to a constructive trust for the benefit of the 
other in the agreed proportion, conditioned upon 
reimbursement for the agreed part of the pur-
chase price. Johnson v. Hayward, 74 Neb. 157, 
103 N.W. 1058, 107 N.W. 384, 5 L.R.A.N.S., 112, 
12 Am. Cas. 800; Lamb v. Sandall, 135 Neb. 300, 
281 N.W. 37; Watkins v. Waits, 148 Neb. 543, 28 
N.W. (2d) 206; Restatement, Restitution, s. 194 
P. 795. 
''This court has repeatedly held that the statute of 
frauds, sections 36-103 and 36-104, R.S. 1943, does 
not apply to a constructive trust growing out of an 
undertaking by one person as agent to purchase 
property for another, where, in violation of his 
agreement, he has taken the title in his own name 
or otherwise for himself and refuses to convey 
after tender of the agreed part of the purchase 
price. '' (Italics added) 
By way of summary the court concluded: 
''Finally, it will be remembered that defendant 
William M. Maddox, while acting in a confidential 
and fiduciary capacity, could not acquire the title 
to the interests involved without the approval or 
ratification of all plaintiffs, and his wife, also in a 
confidential relation, would be equally barred from 
doing so, because said defendant could not do 
indirectly that which he could not do directly. The 
rule generally is tha.t where a pa~rty acting as 
agent or trustee is barred from purcha.sing prop-
erty because of a confidenti.al or fiducia.ry rela-
tionship, the husba;nd or wife of such party is 
equally barred, and no advantage can be gained 
by purchasing the property a;nd taking the title 
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thereto in the name of such husband or wife. In 
re Estate of Jurgensmeier, 142 Neb. 188, 5 N.W. 
(2d) 233; In re Estate- of Statz, 144 Neb. 154, 12 
N.W. (2d) 829; Johnson v. Hayward, Supra; 26 
Am. Jur., Husband and Wife, s. 127, p. 752; 54 
Am. Jur., Trusts, s. 466, p. 370; 65 C. J. Trusts 
s. 646, p. 775.'' (Italics added) 
Other eases where the Courts have imposed a con-
structive trust are: Sime v. Malouf, 95 Cal. App. 2d 82, 
212 P. (2d) 946, where the court held that one who as-
sumes a position of trust and confidence is a fiduciary 
and as long as trust and confidence is deposed in him 
he, remains such fiduciary. 
Raper v. Thorn (Oklahoma 1949) 211 P. (2d) 1007. 
Here plaintiff and defendant were neighbors occupying 
farms in the same area, and were warm friends. There 
was approximately 120 acres of land lying between the 
two farms which was advertised for public sale in pur-
suance of a decree of partition. The parties agreed or 
between themselves that the defendant was to attend the 
sale and purchase the entire tract for the benefit of him-
self and the plaintiff, the plaintiff to acquire 40 acres and 
the defendant to own 80 acres. They were advised by a 
banker that it was not necessary to have such agree-
ment in 'vriting. The plaintiff also offered to pay the 
defendant the amount of the money which might be 
neceessary to purchase the land but the defendant refused 
to take it, stating that he "'"ould not need the check until 
the purchase was made. Although plaintiff claimed that 
he relied upon the defendant's promise to bid in the land 
for benefit of both and did not attend the sale, he never-
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theless had his attorney there. The defendant acquired 
the property at the sale but thereafter requested the 
plaintiii to wait until the sale was confirmed before turn-
ing over to the plaintiff the amount which plaintiff was 
to receive. On learning of the confirmation of sale Mr. 
Presson, attorney for the plaintiff, went to the home of 
the defendant to close the matter and was then advised 
that it would be necessary to take the matter up with 
the defendant's son and the son's wife, to whom defend-
ant had sold the property. Thereafter, at a meeting with 
the children, they refused to make the conveyance, where-
upon suit was instituted. It appeared that the son, Clar-
ence Raper, was fully conversant with the oral agreement 
which had theretofore existed between his father and 
plaintiff. As was claimed in this case, the defendant testi-
fied that before the sale he advised Presson, plaintiff's at-
torney that the agreement was rescinded; that he was not 
going to recognize any agreement as binding ; and would 
~Jindependentl ythereof. Inasmuch as Presson attended 
the sale, the defendant contended that the plaintiff would 
not be entitled to rely upon the agreement. The court, 
however, imposed a constructive trust. 
Evanoff v. Hall, 310 Mich. 487, 17 N.W. (2d) 724, 
where suit was commenced by the plaintiff to establish 
and enforce a constructive trust with respect to land 
which had been purchased by the defendant. The facts of 
the case reveal that plaintiff and defendant were both 
residents of the City of Flint and had been friends for 
some time. Plaintiff was an attorney and had repre-
sented defendant on occasions in the past. On the day 
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in question, the defendant called upon plaintiff and dur-
ing their visit plaintiff advised him that there was to be 
a scavenger sale of certain real property known as Lot 
509, which was located adjacent to plaintiff's home prop-
erty. Plaintiff told defendant that he intended to buy it 
whereupon the the defendant said that he intended to be 
at the scavenager sale on that day to buy some lots for 
himself and would buy the lot for the plaintiff. On the 
day of the sale plaintiff 'vas detained in his office 
and was unable to attend, but the defendant attended and 
bid the lot in his own name for $95.00. Thereafter, plain-
tiff called the defendant and defendant stated that he 
would turn the property over to him - there was noth-
ing to worry about. The defendant admitted that there 
had been an agreement to buy the property for the plain-
tiff but stated that the plainti~ told him that he would 
be there at the sale and buy the property and therefore, 
when he failed to sho'v up, defendant purchased the prop-
erty for himself. See also Trippensee v. Rice, 312 Mich. 
233, 20 N.W. (2d) 172. 
Again, in the case of Bigby v. Tho~rson. 319 Mich. 524, 
30 N.W. (2d) 266, the court held that actual fraud is not 
necessary to give rise to a constructive trust, but if the 
circumstances are such as to render it inequitable for the 
holder of the legal title to retain it, the court may charge 
it with a trust in favor of the equitable owner. 
In Stein v. Soref, 255 '\Tis. 42, 38 N.W. (2d) 3, an 
action was brought by the plaintiffs against the defend-
ant for an adjudication that the plaintiffs are the own-
ers of an interest in an undivided one-fourth interest in 
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certain real property, title to which appeared to be in 
the name of the defendant. In that case there had been 
negotiations between the plaintiffs and defendant to the 
effect that th edefendant would acquire the property for 
the benefit of the plaintiffs as well as the defendant. The 
evidence showed that the property \vas acquired and that 
the defendant had failed to account to the plaintiffs for 
the undivided interest which they were to receive. Under 
such circumstances, the court he~d, ''equity converts the 
defendant into a trustee and thus there is present in these 
transactions a constructive trust created by operation of 
law," citing Bea.tty v. Guggenhim Exploration Company, 
225 N. Y. 380, 122 N.E. 378; K rzysko v. Gudyniski., 207 
Wis. 608, 242 N.W. 186; Schofield v. Rideout, 233 Wis. 
550, 290 N.W. 155, 133 A.L.R. 834. 
See, also, Bla.ck v. Gray, 403 Ill. 503, 87 N.E. (2d) 
635; Rankin v. Saitir, 75 Cal. App. 2d 691, 171 P. 2d 78; 
Johnson v. Cla~rk, 7 Cal (2d) 529, 61 P. (2d) 767; Getken 
v. Shell, 168 Kan. 244, 212 P. (2d) 329; Mackay v. Baker·, 
327 Mich. 57, 41. N.W. (2d) 331. (In the latter case the 
court held the evidence was sufficient to establish a con-
structive trust although based on the plaintiff's testi-
mony alone, uncorroborated by the testimony of inde-
pendent witnesses. 
In the Satir Case, supra, the court discusses the dif-
ference between resulting and constructive trusts and 
holds as to constructive trusts as follows: 
''Constructive trusts of this form are not based 
primarily on the intention of the parties but are 
forced on the conscience of the trustee by equitable 
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construction and the operation of law. Millard v. 
Hathaway, 27 Cal. 119. In such trusts, ?ased upon 
fraud or wrongdoing, an oral promise IS sufficient 
and the existence or absence of a confidential re-
lationship between the parties, in the strict sense, 
is not controlling. Brison v. Brison, 7' Cal. 525, 
17 P. 689, 7 Am. St. Rep. 189. "Such trusts are 
creatures of equity, and take form whenever title 
is obtained by means of chicanery, deceit, or other 
variety of fraud, actual or constructive.'' Sangui-
netti v. Rossen, 12 Cal. App. 623, 107 P. 560, 562. 
In order to create a constructive or involuntary 
trust, as defined in section 2224 of the Civil Code, 
no conditions other than those stated in that sec-
tion are necessary. Lauricella v. Lauricella, 161' 
Cal. 61, 118 P. 430. By section 2223 of that code 
the rule of constructive trust is extended to the 
case where one person wrongfully detains a thing 
from another. The rule extends to almost any case 
where there is a wrongful acquisition or detention 
of property to which another is entitled, since it is 
based upon the equitable principle that no one may 
take advantage of his own wrong. Civ. Code, sec. 
3517. As was said in Brazil v. Silva, 181 Cal. 490, 
185 P. 17 4, 176. 'The instances of its application 
are as various nearly as the ways in which prop-
erty can be wrongfully acquired.' '' 
In Plant v. Schrock, 102 Old. 97, 227 P. 439, appears 
the following statement in the syllabus : 
''A sale by a guardian of real estate belonging to 
his ward to his sister-in-la:\v through the interpo-
sition of a third person, \vith the secret under-
standing that the purchaser not pay for the same 
and for the purpose of securing a loan thereon, 
constitutes a fraud on the estate of the minor and 
may be set aside against the parties to the fraud 
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and any person not a bona fide purchaser for 
value, but such sale is not void.'' 
A good annotation on the subject IS contained in 
27 A.L.R. (2d) 1285, supplementing earlier annotations 
found in 42 A.L.R. 10 and 135 A.L.R. 232. 
This is an equity case and the court should invoke 
the equitable principles set forth above to prevent the 
defendants from obtaining an unjust enrichment at the 
expense of the plaintiff. If defendants should claim 
that plaintiff has no remedy because title to the property 
was taken in the name of Jack Donald Toombs instead of 
Alma or Roland, the case of Hawkins v. Peery, supra, and 
Maddox v. Maddox, fully answer this argument. 
Too, the Findings of the court (which were prepared 
by counsel for defendants) state ''that the said transac-
tion of the sale and purchase ... was concluded by Alma 
Toombs, grandfather of Jack Donald Toombs, as agent 
and for the use and benefit of Jack Donald Toombs'' 
(Finding No. 13, R. 517). With this Finding we agree. 
However, "\Ve cannot, because of such Finding, agree with 
the subsequent Finding No. 19 to the effect that Jack 
Donald Toombs ''did not at any time have any knowledge 
of any conversation, if there was such conversation, 
whereby Joseph G. Toombs had asked Alma Toombs to 
purchase the last above described real property for him 
from Edris Glasmann. '' It is elementary law that the 
principal is bound by the knowledge of his agent in con-
nection with the agent's employment. 
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The evidence in this case, when considered in the 
light of the principles of the law applicable thereto, re-
quired the trial court to impose a constructive trust in 
favor of the plaintiff. 
III. 
ER.ROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN EFUSING TO 
REO·PEN THE CASE. 
After counsel for defendants failed to submit any 
proposed Findings or Conclusions for four years from 
the time the court announced its determination of the 
issues, plaintiff felt compelled to file a Motion to reopen 
the case for the purpose of rearaguing the matter with 
or without additional estimony (R. 512). This Motion in 
effect constituted a Motion for a new trial under the pro-
visions of Rule 59 (a) and 59 (e) U.R.C P. While coun-
sel has not been able to find any decisions in respect to 
his present argument that failure to grant such Motion 
was error, lack of any authority on the matter would seem 
to indicate that no court had in the past taken such a pro-
tracted length of time to conclude a case or to enter 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of La"·, and Decree after 
having decided the issues. Rule ( 41 (b) provides for dis-
missal of an action for failure of plaintiff to pursue his 
action with reasonable diligence but no apparent relief 
is afforded to a party ,x;here the eourt - 'Yhether trial or 
appellate - takes an unreasonable and unconscionable 
length of time to decide the issues bet,Yeen the parties and 
render its judgment or decision thereon. As has re-
cently happened in another case in which eouusel 'vas 
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interested, serious material damage has resulted from 
the failure of the court to perform its function with rea-
sonable promptitude. It appears to counsel that under 
such circumstances the proper and equitable course of 
action to pursue would be to allow the parties to be 
heard on the merits - if necessary, before a different 
judge - in order that justice be accomplished. A com-
plete review of the evidence in this case, as has been made 
herein, should have been made. We feel confident that 
such a review would have required a determination of 
the issues in favor of plaintiff. 
SUMMARY 
In conclusion, we would like to summarize for the 
benefit of the court. 
I. Plaintiff is the o'vner of an undivided one-third 
interest in the 1861;2 acres of land described in the 
complaint: 
A. He purchased the land in about 1906 with his 
father from the defendant Alma Toombs : 
1. Not only testified by the witnesses but admit-
ted by defendants in their original answer. 
2. Affidavit of Joseph M. Toombs to that effect 
appears as Exhibit 3, together with testimony 
that Joseph M. Toombs on more than one occa-
sion stated his son owned one-third of the land. 
B. Plaintiff paid the taxes on the land. 
C. Defendants had knowledge that plaintiff had 
49 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
been in possession of the property for over 40 
years, and claimed a one-third interest therein. 
D. During the time plaintiff has been in posses-
sion of the land he has assisted in fencing it so 
that it is entirely enclosed and has occupied it ex-
clusively since 1940. 
II. The Court should impose a constructive trust on 
the balance of the land, making the defendants contruc-
tive trustees as to the entire tract for the benefit of the 
plaintiff. Upon paying the amount of the purchase price 
by plaintiff the defendants should be required to convey 
to said plaintiff and account for the rents, issues and 
profits received by them. 
A. Property ·w,.as deeded by Joseph :JI. Toombs to 
his daughter Edris Glasmann, without considera-
tion, for the sole purpose of having her sell it to 
pay his medical and hospital expenses and with 
the expressed desire that his son Joseph G. Toombs 
be given the first opportunity to purchase. 
B. Although plaintiff made two bids on the prop-
erty it did not appear that he would be able to 
acquire it; nor did his sister eYer contact plain-
tiff personally in an attempt to sell it to him. 
C. Defendant Alma Toombs, \Yith the knowledge 
of defendants Roland Toombs and Jack Donald 
Toombs, agreed "~ith plaintiff that he, Alma 
Toombs, would acquire the land for the plaintiff 
if plaintiff 'vould conYey approximately t""'"o acres 
to defendant to protect the latter in connection 
50 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with certain improvements located on adjoining 
land. 
1. The fact that such agreement existed was 
testified to by plaintiff and certain of his wit-
nesses and admitted by each of the defendants. 
2. The agreement between plaintiff and de-
fendant Alma Toombs was admitted by the orig-
inal Answer filed by defendants and later ad-
mitted by them in their depositions, but defend-
ants later contended that the defendant Alma 
Toombs had rescinded it. (Note: The court 
made no finding on this.) 
3. All parties, including defendant, testified 
that at at the meeting in Alma Toombs' home 
in January 1949, the defendants agreed to turn 
the property over to the plaintiff, but requested 
time "to have it -surveyed again so as to ascertain 
exactly the portion needed to protect defendants' 
out buildings. 
D. In violation of the agreement with plaintiff, 
Defendant Alma Toombs, with his son Roland who 
had knowledge of the agreement, purchased the 
property and put in the name of Jack Donald 
Toombs. 
III. If the trial court had granted plaintiff's Motion 
to reopen the case for the purpose of reargument, or to 
take additional testimony, the overwhelming force of 
the evidence, as reported hereinabove, would have re-
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quired the trial court to reverse its decision and enter 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
A~ The trial court manifestly abused its discretion 
in refusing to reopen the matter after more than 
five years had elapsed from the submission of the 
case to it. 
We respectfully submit that the decision of the trial 
court should be reversed and the cause remanded with 
instructions to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
and against the defendants and requiring defendants to 
account to plaintiff for the rents, issues and profits de-
rived by them from the use and occupation of the prop-
erty in question since 1949. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
OMER CALL 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
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